Although many miners interviewed expressed surprise that such an explosion had occurred at Peckfield Colliery, they knew the likely cause of the disaster from experience. Indeed, this was Robert Henry Nevins’ fourth encounter with colliery explosions. Some newspapers complained that there had been so many similar disasters caused by naked candle lights igniting firedamp gas, that it should not be sufficient to simply publish another investigation dismissing the cause as unforeseeable, and to hold no-one responsible. The Yorkshire Post reported on 14th May 1896 that “no definite opinion can yet be advanced as to the cause of the catastrophe, but it is significant that the management are now busily engaged in erecting a commodious lamp-room by the side of the engine-house; and in future the pit will be worked with safety lamps instead of naked lights, notwithstanding the reputation it has so long enjoyed as a safe mine.”
On Wednesday 20th May 1896, the initial inquest to examine the cause of the explosion was held at Micklefield Club, and was reported in the Leeds Times on 23rd May:
On 12th September 1896, The Leeds Mercury reported that the Home Office report into the causes of the explosion had been produced, and reported it as follows. The full report is also shown below:
Micklefield colliery explosion
Official report
Mr. Harold Thomas, barrister, and Mr. Frank N. Wardell, Inspector of Mines for Yorkshire and Lincolnshire, presented their reports to the Home Secretary on the explosion which took place in Micklefield colliery, near Leeds, on the 30th April last, and by which 63 men and boys lost their lives.
Mr. Thomas remarks that there was very little trace of explosive gas given off prior to the explosion, and no blowers or sounds, even of hissing, appeared to have been discovered. Eleven instances of small escapes were reported during the five years preceding the explosion, which were easily and quickly removed by the ventilation. The two last were on the 17th and the 23rd of December 1895, each in James Plum’s Gate in the East level Division, at the south east of the Beeston bed, and coming from the same place, a crack in the roof, and each was cleared away within twelve hours after discovery. Before the explosion, coal dust was never believed by the manager, the three deputies of the night shift, or Mr. H.S. Childe, the engineer of the lessor of the colliery, to exist in any dangerous quantity likely to explode, but undoubtedly the ignition of it caused the loss of most, if not all, of the lives of the 63 persons killed. In considering the relation of coal dust to the explosion, the following questions suggested themselves:- 1. Where was it, and how did it arise? 2. What steps were taken to prevent or allay it? Thin films of dust not exceeding one-sixteenth part of an inch thick had been seen on the props and doors of some of the roads used for the haulage of coal, and it was admitted that there might have been some accumulations of dust behind the timbering or on the sides and roofs of the roads. The hardness of the coal was not likely to produce much dust. Probably some dust arose by the shaking of the loaded tubs during transit, and was blown out of them when travelling against the air. No screening of coal took place underground, but all was done at the pit top. No blasting was done in the intakes, but at the working faces only. Whatever dust was found on the roadways of the intakes, was removed generally every evening. The dust so removed was stated to be principally shale dust, trampled up by the horses drawing the tubs. The dust on the roofs and sides of the roads was not cleared off in the manner described, but sometimes at no stated periods however. When undoubted coal dust was found in any part of the Beeston bed it was specially removed. None had been thus removed from the New North Road for six months previous to the explosion. Besides clearing dust away, the roadways, and not the roofs and sides, were watered, and this again was not done at any regular times. The last occasion was about a fortnight before the explosion. Safety lamps were used by the deputies during the examination of the seams, before the commencement of the shift, and also previously to any blasting. For coal getting and every other purpose than those just mentioned, naked lights were employed. Prior to the explosion no official, or miner, or Mr. Childe, was of opinion that the use of naked lights was unsafe, by reason either of explosive gas or coal dust. All the traces of the course of the explosion that were found were upon coal haulage roads, or in and about the downcast shaft, and in those places alone were any burnt bodies found. The bodies that were found in the return air ways were in every instance those of men who had been overcome by afterdamp. It seemed to be generally believed by experts that something stronger than the flame of a naked light was needed to ignited coal dust. If, then, the suggestion that firedamp came into contact with a naked light, and thus started the explosion, was incorrect, it was impossible to suggest how the coal dust was originally fired. Assuming it had to be correct, the use of a naked light was the original cause of the explosion. It was, without doubt, the ignition of coal dust which carried the explosion forward from its initial point. The opinion of many competent persons practically acquainted with the coal mining was that, to be a source of danger, coal dust must be present in a mine in such a manner as to be ordinarily appreciable as such. Evidence of this opinion was laid before the Coroner’s jury, and it was also proved that coal dust was not perceived in the colliery to the appreciable extent just alluded to. The jury were therefore justified in saying that “no blame is to be attached to any person.” Were no further precautions to be taken in the future working of the Beeston bed to provide against dangers arising from the firing of coal dust then were adopted down to the time of the explosion, and another explosion of coal dust were to happen, resulting in death, it would be a serious question (continues Mr. Thomas) whether some one responsible for the management of the Micklefield colliery might not be guilty of manslaughter on the ground of culpable negligence. But the readiness shown to guard against danger from the ignition of fire-damp by the provision of safety lamps, and the general liberality of the management of the colliery itself, gave good grounds to anticipate that reasonable endeavours would be made to lessen, and, if possible, avoid altogether the chance of any future ignition of coal dust in the Micklefield pit. The explosion having occurred, the question arose for the careful consideration of mining experts whether any colliery was secure from liability to an explosion of coal dust. If the answer to this question was in the negative, legislative provision was necessary adequately to deal with it. Upon the evidence which was given at the inquest, Mr. Thomas submits the following conclusions:- That the probable cause of the explosion was by fire-damp coming in contact with a naked light and exploding and thus igniting coal dust; that coal dust carried the explosion forward from its initial point; that naked lights ought not to be used in the Micklefield colliery; that further precautions than those adopted prior to the explosion to avoid dangers arising from coal dust should be taken in the colliery; and that no prosecution should be instituted against anyone in respect of the explosion. Mr. Wardell, in his report, says – The course of the explosion had evidently been throughout from west to east. The night deputies had, no doubt, performed their duties, and made an examination of the pit. The reports were duly entered in the report books. Lillyman, the night deputy, stated that he found all in good order when he visited the place, and it was possible that the falls, or part of them, afterwards found might have occurred subsequent to his examination and before the explosion, and liberated a small quantity of gas. He (Mr. Wardell) believed that No. 43 had left his pony in the New North Road at the gate end, and gone forward to Goodall’s gate for some purpose or other, and that there the gas fired at his naked light. He was blown towards the New North Road, his body being much burnt and otherwise injured. The pony was blown across the road where it had been left, right against the east side of the New North Road. The initial flame thus produced was then carried forward by dust which the concussion no doubt disturbed, and which was answerable for the remaining effects of the explosion. He further believed that in the first instance the amount of gas was inconsiderable. In the whole course of his investigations, he did not see a trace of fire-damp. The pit had never been considered to come within the meaning of a dry and dusty one to such an extent as to be dangerous in any degree; indeed, the south side below the east and west levels was decidedly damp. There was no evidence whatever of the explosion having affected the coal faces, and results were, as usual, confined almost entirely to the main intake roads – the returns being comparatively uninjured, and in very good condition. There was no suspicion of the disaster being the result of shot-firing, no shot having been fired for more than 24 hours previous to the explosion. The ventilation of the mine was amply adequate. Naked lights had been used all through the pit from its commencement, about 23 years ago, and shot-firing had been going on day by day. Both were considered to be perfectly safe, and yet, at the end of this long interval of time, the terrible disaster occurred. The factor gives rise to most serious anxiety, and an impression that the safest and proper course to take would be to prohibit naked lights in every pit, and restrict the mode of shot-firing to the use of high explosives. This might be looked upon by some as a hardship, but it would surely be better than running the risk of such a sacrifice of human life in what was considered to be a perfectly safe pit. The question of dust, too, was one which demanded the most serious consideration. The removal of this element of danger should be regular, and as complete as practicable. Although the amount of dust was not considered to be sufficient to render it dangerous, there was no doubt that, with the experience of recent years, greater care might have been taken with a view to its removal. So far as the future working of the colliery is concerned, a pump was being erected at the bottom of the shaft, from which pipes would be laid throughout the main haulage roads with sprinklers at intervals, and these would be used three times a week, or oftener, if found necessary. The timber in these roads would be swept, and the dust removed regularly every week, when the roads were wet. Safety lamps would be exclusively used, and gunpowder prohibited, a high explosive being substituted.
On Tuesday 2nd March 1897, the Yorkshire Evening Post reported that the adoption of miners’ lamps had caused such unrest at Peckfield Colliery that the miners were set to strike. Effectively they had to pay more for the lamp than the cost of candles, and were doubly punished as the lamps hindered their productivity. The strike was short-lived, but demonstrated again that the miners tended to pick up and absorb such costs:
30th April 1896. The Peckfield Colliery Disaster at Micklefield 